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Abstract
Intentional and unintentional radiofrequency interference (i.e., jamming) can result in
degraded navigation accuracy or complete loss of the GNSS signal tracking. Jammers can be
classified into three broad categories: Narrowband Jammers (NBJ), Spread Spectrum Jammers
(SSJ) and Wideband Gaussian Jammers (WGJ). In recent years, a number of effective
jamming detection and anti-jamming (filtering and suppression) techniques have been
developed for military GNSS applications and some of them are envisaged to be used for civil
purposes (e.g., terrorist attacks). The synergies between these jamming detection techniques
and our newly developed Avionics-Based Integrity Augmentation (ABIA) system are
investigated in this paper. In particular, GNSS vulnerability to NBJ, SSJ and WGJ types of
jamming is analytically described in terms of Jamming to Signal (J/S) tracking thresholds and
the models for calculating the minimum acceptable aircraft-to-jammer ranges are presented.
Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed ABIA architecture is capable of performing
jamming detection and avoidance when GNSS is considered as the primary source of
navigation data.
Keywords: Global Navigation Satellite System, Jamming, Air Navigation, Integrity
Augmentation and Trajectory Optimisation.
Introduction
Typically, GNSS signals reach the airborne receivers at very low power, and radiofrequency
interference can be the result of a number of potential sources including:
 Unintentional interference in the operating frequency band.
 Intentional jamming (e.g., premeditated GNSS signal attack including terrorist
activities and electronic warfare).
 High-power signals in the adjacent frequency bands.
 Denial of service and scheduled outages.
 Natural interference including solar flares.
The positioning accuracy obtained from the satellite signals is degraded or completely lost due
to jamming and in turn affects the availability of the system. The current reliance on GNSS
signals for many safety- and mission-critical tasks raises the issue of electronic warfare
vulnerability and at the same time safety of other aircraft. Jamming tolerance can be increased
with smarter processing techniques in the receiver prior to the detection stage. Furthermore,
the spectral spreading techniques adopted in GNSS receivers mitigate the effect of jamming.
Although the GPS system is well designed to mitigate any jamming effects, like any radio
receiver, it can still be jammed. Anti-jamming techniques become essential once the signal
strength of the interfering signal becomes significant. Considering a sample case of Global
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Positioning System (GPS) signals, the L1 C/A signal received from the 25 W transmitter with
a 13 dBiC antenna at a range of 12, 550 miles is in the order of -150 dBW. The impact caused
by jamming on GNSS detection capability has been studied and analytically described [1, 2].
Though a number of effective jamming detection and anti-jamming (filtering and suppression)
techniques have been developed in the last two decades for military applications, only a few
methods are available for civil use [3, 4]. A number of systems have been designed and
implemented to detect jamming such as Jammer Detection and LOCation System (JLOC) in
the US and GNSS Availability, Accuracy, Reliability and Integrity Assessment for timing and
Navigation system (GAARDIAN) in UK. Jammers are classified into three broad categories:
Narrowband Jammers (NBJ), Spread Spectrum Jammers (SSJ) and Wideband Gaussian
Jammers (WGJ). Typical jamming signals can be classified into four classes:
 Class I: continuous wave signal.
 Class II: chirp signal with one saw-tooth function.
 Class III: chirp signal with multi saw-tooth functions.
 Class IV: chirp signal with frequency bursts.
In the majority of cases, jamming signals are transmitted in the L1/E1 band, which are used in
receivers for civilian applications. These signals can affect all GNSS signals including GPS,
Galileo, GLObalnaya NAvigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS), BeiDou
(Compass), Indian Regional Navigational Satellite System (IRNSS) and Quasi-Zenith
Satellite System (QZSS).
ABIA System
In the case of an avionics navigation system, integrity directly relates to the level of
confidence that can be placed in the information provided by the on-board system. It includes
the ability of the navigation system to provide timely and valid warnings to users when the
system must not be used for the intended operation or phase of flight. Specifically, an avionics
navigation system is required to deliver an alert of any malfunction (as a result of a set alert
threshold being exceeded) to users within a given period of time. The GNSS augmentation is
based on additional information provided by other avionic systems. In most cases, the
additional avionic systems operate via separate principles than the GNSS and, therefore, are
not subject to the same sources of error or interference. A system such as this is referred to as
an Avionics-Based or Aircraft-Based Augmentation System (ABAS). While other available
augmentation systems such as Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) and Satellite-
Based Augmentation System (SBAS) address all GNSS performance augmentation including
accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity, the ABAS approach is particularly significant
to increase the levels of integrity and accuracy of GNSS in a variety of mission- and safety-
critical aviation applications. Previous research on Avionics-Based Integrity Augmentation
(ABIA) demonstrated the potential of this technology to enhance GNSS integrity performance
in a variety of mission- and safety-critical applications including experimental flight test/flight
inspection, precision approach and autoland [5-7]. An advanced ABIA integration scheme
was also developed specifically addressing the cooperative and non-cooperative Sense-and-
Avoid (SAA) functions required in Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) applications
[8]. The ABIA system architecture is illustrated in Fig. 1. The on-board sensors provide
information on the aircraft relevant flight parameters to an Integrity Flag Generator (IFG).
Using the available data on GNSS and the relevant aircraft flight parameters, integrity signals
are generated which are transmitted to the cockpit display and also provided as aural warnings
to the pilots. These integrity flags are subsequently used by a Flight Path Optimisation
Module (FPOM). The ABIA system addresses both the predictive and reactive nature of
GNSS integrity augmentation by producing suitable integrity flags (cautions and warnings) in
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case of predicted/ascertained GNSS data losses or unacceptable signal degradations exceeding
the Required Navigation Performance (RNP) specified for each phase of flight. Additionally,
it provides information to the on-board pilot in a manned aircraft or to the RPAS pilot in the
Ground Control Station (GCS) to avoid further data losses/degradations.
Fig. 1: ABIA system architecture. Adapted from [8].
The IFG module generates the Caution Integrity Flag (CIF) and Warning Integrity Flag (WIF)
alerts. The CIF is a predictive annunciation that the GNSS data delivered to the avionics
system is going to exceed the RNP thresholds specified for the current and planned flight
operational tasks (GNSS alert status), while the WIF is a reactive annunciation that the GNSS
data delivered to the avionics system has exceeded the RNP thresholds specified for the
current flight operational task (GNSS fault status). The Time-to-Caution (TTC) is defined as
the minimum time allowed for the caution flag to be provided to the user before the onset of a
GNSS fault resulting in an unsafe condition and Time-to-Warning (TTW) is the maximum
time allowed from the moment a GNSS fault resulting in an unsafe condition is detected to the
moment that the ABIA system provides a warning flag to the user.
ABIA Integrity Flags for Jamming
The main causes of GNSS data degradation or signal losses in aviation applications are
analytically modeled in [5, 6]. The threshold limits required for the IFG to produce caution
and warning flags are identified in [7]. The thresholds are set based on the aircraft-satellite
relative geometry including estimated Horizontal and Vertical Position Error (HPE/VPE),
radio frequency elements and receiver tracking loops. The Scalar Tracking Loops (STL)
typically employs Delay Lock Loops (DLL) to track the code phase and Phase Lock Loops
(PLL) or Frequency Lock Loops (FLL) to track the carrier phase. Current state-of-the-art STL
also employ combined PLL and FLL for carrier tracking to obtain better results in navigation
position accuracy and to enhance tracking [5-8]. Currently, Vector Tracking Loops (VTL) are
also employed, which are based on advanced receiver architectures capable of tracking signals
in a combined manner [9]. VTL provide the advantages of operating at a lower total carrier
power to noise ratio (C/N0) and in higher dynamics environments when compare with STL
logics. A typical GNSS receiver is connected to a GNSS antenna and consists of a RF front
end, a digital signal processor used to calculate code range, carrier phase and Doppler
frequencies and to generate the navigational data, and a navigation processor used to calculate
the Position, Velocity and Time (PVT) solution. The method adopted to determine the CIF
and WIF thresholds are described in [5, 6]. The link budget of the direct GNSS signals
received by the aircraft in the presence of atmospheric propagation disturbances is calculated
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based on C/N0, as well as the applicable radiofrequency interference. In general, the effects of
GNSS signal jamming are:
 Jamming affects the GNSS receiver’s ܥ/ܰ଴.
 Signal-to-noise ratio (S/N) decreases.
 Jamming contributes to multipath effects of GNSS signals in dense urban areas.
 When jamming exists, GNSS receivers might react differently from the ideal case.
The relationship between effective carrier-to-noise ratio (C/N) and jammer signal power (J) is
given by [10]:
஼
ே
= [ܥ/ܰ଴]/ቈ1 + ቀ಴ಿబቁቀ಻ೄቁோ௖ ቉ (1)
where ܰ଴ is the thermal noise power spectral density, ܴܿ is the P-code chipping rate, S is the
signal power received at the GNSS antenna input, C is the carrier power and J/S is the
jamming-to-signal ratio. In the general method, range to the jammer, atmospheric losses, and
a corresponding noise in the jammer are computed, all as a function of time along the
trajectory. Jamming is modelled based on the J/S levels. The J/S performance of a GNSS
receiver at its tracking threshold can be evaluated by the following equation [11]:
௃
ௌ
= 10 logܴܳ஼ቈ1/10଴.ଵቀ಴ಿబቁಾ ಺ಿ − 1/10଴.ଵቀ಴ಿబቁ቉ (2)
where ܳ is the processing gain adjustment factor and is equal to 1 for Narrowband Jammers
(NBJ), 1.5 for Spread Spectrum Jammers (SSJ) and 2 for Wideband Gaussian Jammers
(WGJ), ܴ஼ is the code chipping rate (chips/s) and (ܥ/ܰ଴)ெ ூே is the receiver tracking
threshold (dB-Hz). Since the weak limit in an avionics receiver is the carrier tracking loop
threshold, this threshold is usually substituted for (ܥ/ܰ଴)ெ ூே . During the flight test activities
performed on TORNADO-IDS with unaided C/A code avionics receivers, it was found that in
all dynamics conditions explored and in the absence of jamming, a (ܥ/ܰ଴) of 25 dB-Hz was
sufficient to keep tracking the satellites. As an example, using this 25 dB-Hz tracking
threshold, we can calculate the J/S performance of the TORNDO-IDS GPS receiver
considering one of the satellites tracked during the descent and during this manoeuvre, the
C/N0 for Pseudo Random Noise (PRN) PRN-14 was about 37 dB-Hz. Table 1 shows the
corresponding J/S calculations, assuming (ܥ/ܰ଴)ெ ூே = 25 dB-Hz.
Table 1: J/S calculations for 25 dB-Hz tracking threshold
Jamming Q ܴ஼ (ܥ/ܰ଴)௧௛௥௘௦௛௢௟ௗ (ܥ/ܰ଴) J/S
NBJ 1 1.023* 10଺ 25 dB-Hz 37 34.82
SSJ 1.5 1.023* 10଺ 25 dB-Hz 37 36.58
WGJ 2 1.023* 10଺ 25 dB-Hz 37 37.83
The transmitted power of the jammer and its distance with respect to the GNSS receiver
required for jamming is expressed in terms of Effective Radiated Power (ERP). Using these
J/S values, the minimum range in metres from a jamming source can be calculated from:
ܴ௠ ௜௡ = ఒೕସగ 10ಶೃು೟ೕషುೝೕశಸೝೕషಽೝ೑మబ ) (3)
where ܧܴ ௧ܲ௝ is the effective radiated power of the jammer (dBw), j is the wavelength of
jammer frequency (m), ௥ܲ௝is the received (incident) jamming power level at threshold = J/S +
௥ܲ௦ (dBw), ௥ܲ௦ is the minimum received (incident) signal power (dBw), ܩ௥௝ is the GNSS
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antenna gain towards the jammer (dBiC) and ܮ௥௙ is the jammer power attenuation due to
recover front-end filtering (dB). The PLL, FLL and DLL error models described in [6] allow
determining the C/N଴ corresponding to the receiver tracking thresholds. The integrity flag
criterion applicable to the ABIA system is [7, 8]:
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where (C/N଴)୔୐୐ is the minimum C/N଴ for PLL tracking, (C/N଴)୊୐୐is the minimum C/N଴
for FLL tracking, (C/N଴)ୈ୐୐is the minimum C/N଴ for DLL tracking, (C/N଴)୔୐୐ା୊୐୐is the
minimum C/N଴ for combined PLL and FLL tracking and (C/N଴)୚୘୐is the minimum C/N଴ for
VTL based tracking. In general, when the PLL loop order is made higher, there is an
improvement in dynamic stress performance. Therefore, third order PLL are widely adopted
in avionics GNSS receivers. Assuming 15 to 18 Hz noise bandwidth and 5 to 20 msec pre
detection integration time (typical values for avionics receivers), the tracking threshold for the
PLL gives 25 to 28 dB-Hz. The main error associated with a GNSS receiver FLL are the
dynamics stress error and frequency jitter caused due to thermal noise. The receiver tracking
threshold is adopted such that the 3-sigma jitter must not exceed one-fourth of the frequency
pull-in range of the FLL discriminator. Using theoretical and experimental threshold values,
the receiver J/S performance for the various cases of practical interest are calculated. When
available, flight test data collected in representative portions of the aircraft operational flight
envelope shall be used. The criteria for generating CIF and WIF based on J/N ratio is
described in earlier research [5-7, 11-12]. Considering an additional 5% margin on the 3-
sigma tracking thresholds for the CIF, the following detailed criteria are introduced for the
ABIA integrity thresholds:
 When either 42.25° ≤ 3σ୔୐୐ ≤ 45° or 0.2375T ≤ 3σ୊୐୐ ≤ 0.25T or 0.05d ≤
3σୈ୐୐ ≤ d, the CIF shall be generated.
 When either 3σ୔୐୐ > 45°or 3σ୊୐୐ > 1/4ܶor 3σୈ୐୐ > ,݀ the WIF shall be generated.
The processing of GNSS signals in a receiver specific to anti-jamming function is illustrated
in Fig. 2. Interference detection is typically performed based on a number of receiver
parameters including output power, variance and standard deviation of the output power
(correlated), carrier phase uncertainty and Automatic Gain Control (AGC) values. The key
component to detect interference in the received signal is the Automatic Gain Control (AGC).
In order to minimize the signal loss, the amplitude of the received GNSS signal is tuned to the
ADC range. The gain in AGC drops significantly when there is an increased power in the
GNSS bandwidth. The chirp signals are predominantly used for jamming in the recent times.
Chirp signals are typically sinusoidal or cosine signals with sweeping of frequency within in-
band GNSS frequency ranges. The chirp signals are modelled using a periodic Frequency
Modulated (FM) signal and can be expressed as [12, 13]:
ݔ(ݐ) = a sin(2ߨ∑ (∫ ଵ݂ (ݐᇱ௧଴ஶ௛ୀ଴ − ℎ. ௦ܶ,ଵ).݀ݐᇱ+⋯+ ∫ ௡݂ (ݐᇱ−௧଴ ℎ. ௦ܶ,௡).݀ݐᇱ)) (5)
where ଵ݂(ݐᇱ− ℎ. ௦ܶ,ଵ) is the 1st saw tooth function, ௡݂(ݐᇱ− ℎ. ௦ܶ,௡) is the nth saw tooth
function, ௦ܶ,௡ is the sweep time. A number of algorithms have been proposed for jamming
detection, localisation and characterisation of interfering signals. Considering a GNSS jammer
transmitting chirp signals (with zero mean) from a random position, the received signal can be
expressed as:
ݏ௥(ݐ) = ݏ௧(ݐ)ට( ௖௙೎.ସగ.ௗ)ఈ .݁௝ଶగ௙೎ௗ/௖ (6)
where ݏ௧(ݐ) is the transmitted jammer signal, ௖݂ is the carrier signal, ݀ is the distance between
the jammer and the reciver, ߙis the path loss and c is the speed of light. In order to improve
the hostile effects of GNSS in electronic warfare and terrorist attacks, new generation signals
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are being introduced. These signals inherently possess higher precision of orientation and anti-
jamming performance, and are also compatible existing GNSS signals. Binary Offset Carrier
(BOC) modulation is introduced to increase the ERP for anti-jamming performance without
affecting the existing GNSS signals. In these cases, Costas loop is used as carrier tracking
loop to receive BOC modulated signals. When a jamming signal interferes with the GNSS
signal, phase measurement error increases beyond a specified threshold value and as a
consequence the tracking loop loses lock.
Fig. 2: GNSS receiver processing for anti-jamming function
The design of the GNSS antenna generally provides a superior polarisation signal reception
and poor low elevation angle gain. As a result of superior polarisation, cross polarisation
reception is less than -10dBic and thus effectively reduces unwanted signal reflections. In
order to design GNSS receivers against interference, bandwidth, sampling and hardware
considerations are taken into account. In order to increase the accuracy of the signal, narrow
correlator spacing is employed by sharpening up the auto correlation function. Therefore, it is
ensured that the correlators are still operating in a linear range. Noise increases due to the
increase in pre-correlation bandwidth but it can effectively tackled by employing superior
digital signal processing algorithms. Generally, the signal processor adopted has the capability
of performing code correlation in two different modes: an early-minus-late power mode and a
dot-product mode. The signal processor has two correlators in each channel and can operate
one of the correlators as an early or an early-minus-late correlator. The normalised dot-
product discriminator is given by [14]:
݀߬= ூ೐ష಺ூುାொ೐ష಺ொು
ூು
మାொು
మ (7)
where I and Q values are summed over the Prediction Integration Interval (PDI). ܫ௘ିூ and
ܳ௘ିூ represent the I and Q values when the hardware in implemented in the dot-product mode.
P stands for I and Q and are similar to the ones used in carrier loop discriminators. For an
infinite pre-correlation bandwidth, the normalised Early-minus-Late (EL) discriminator has an
output at high values of SNR and the estimation is given by:
ܧ(݀ )߬ = ସ(ଶିௗ)ఛ(ଶିௗ)మାସఛమ chips, -d/2≤ ߬≤ d/2                                    (8) 
where ߬ is the tracking error and ݀ is the EL discriminator spacing in chips. The standard
deviation of the pseudorange observations (ߪఛ) is estimated from the discriminator output
standard deviation (ߪௗ) and is given by:
ߪఛ = √ଶ்஻ீ೏ ߪௗ (9)
where Gୢ is the gain of the discriminator and B is the bandwidth. For example, for a loop
bandwisth of 1/30 Hz, the resulting σத is approximately 0.3 cycles. In avionics receivers, lock
detectors are used to assess if the satellite signals are being tracked or not tracked. Code lock
detection is adopted, which is very similar to estimating the received C/N଴, inferring that the
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receiver is operating on or near the correlation peak. The code-correlation process of the
receiver is designed to increase the signal strength when compared to that of inherent and
added noise. The spread spectrum processing gain (ܩ௣) is defined as the ratio of the spread
bandwidth to the unspread (baseband) bandwidth and is expressed in dB. The post-correlation/ܵܰ is given as: ( /ܵܰ)௣௢௦௧ି ௖௢௥௥. = ( /ܵܰ)௣௥௘ି௖௢௥௥. + ܩ௣ (10)
When the receiver code is aligned with the transmitted code, the signal power at the band pass
output is crushed into approximately 100 Hz of bandwidth. The processing gain can be
calculated from:
ܩ௉ = 10 ݋݈݃ ቀଶ஼ೃ்ವ ቁ[݀ܤ] (11)
where ܥோ is the chipping rate and ஽ܶ is the data period. For the C/A code this works out to be
about 43 dB. Typical avionics receivers have a cut off value at 10 dB, which means that if the
value is less than this the satellite signal level is too low to be used in the positioning
computations [14]. An additional threshold criterion to be accounted for in the ABIA system
is given as:
ܵ/ܰ௣௢௦௧ି ௖௢௥௥. = /ܵܰ௣௥௘ି ௖௢௥௥. + ܩ௣ ³ 10݀ܤ (12)
 When ܩ௣ is more than 11 dB (margin of 1 dB), the CIF shall be generated.
 When ܩ௣ is less than 9 dB (margin of 1 dB), the WIF shall be generated.
Avoidance of Jamming Environment
A number of jamming mitigation techniques are normally adopted as counteract measures.
The adoption of filters to fade out the jamming signal is usually employed. Specifically, a
notch filter (narrowband band stop filter) is used against continuous wave or narrowband
electronic attacks. Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Modules (SAASM) are employed by
the US DoD for tackling spoofing of GNSS signals. Controlled Radiation Pattern Antenna
(CPRA) offering null steering is often bulky and expensive. Multi-constellation / multi-
frequency receivers including the ones using embedded Software Defined Radio (SDR) based
processing are used for tackling jamming. An analysis of the identified degradation results in
inferring that a common criterion based on satellite elevation variation in the body frame can
be adopted. Depending upon the technique used to capture the jammer’s coordinates, the
targeting error represents approximately half of the final Circular Error Probable (CEP).
Earlier methods to overcome jamming adopted the integration of GNSS with other navigation
sensors; say Inertial Navigation System (INS) sensors [10]. When it is detected that the
tracking loop (PLL/FLL/DLL/VTL) has lost lock in a jamming environment, the GNSS signal
is decoupled from the integrated navigation system and then guidance for avoidance trajectory
is obtained from the calibrated INS operating in a coast mode. Generally, in a tightly coupled
architecture, the GNSS data is used to aid the navigation solution, and the INS is used to
remove the majority of the error from the signal input to the GPS tracking loops. The amount
of Doppler error that can be removed is determined from the accuracy of the navigation
solution, and further, by the dynamics of the manned aircraft/RPAS. If the integrated
navigation solution is more accurate, then the error is drastically reduced and the receiver loop
bandwidth is reduced leading to the susceptibility to jammer noise. The GPS carrier tracking
loop is more susceptible to jamming due to the small wavelength of the carrier (0.19 metres)
compared to the P-code chip width (29.3 meters). One method of detecting carrier loop lock is
to monitor the detected phase error estimate (u) in the PLL and is expressed as [10]:
Track quality indicator = cos 2u (13)
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The threshold of the loop is dynamically altered according to the computed S/N ratio and it is
assumed that a loss of lock is evident when the signal strength falls below a fixed threshold. In
order to compute the signal generated for input to the tracking loops, noise due to bot thermal
and jammer sources is superimposed on the signals. Noise is generally assumed to be
Gaussian in nature and its power is obtained from C/N value and the noise power is given by:
Noise power = ܲௌܤ/ (C/N) (14)
where ௌܲ is the recived satellite signal power and ܤ is the prediction bandwidth. The design of
avoiding jamming environment by adopting ABIA system involves the evaluation of the
overall avoidance volume. The overall avoidance volume is obtained by combining the
avoidance volume resulting from the jammer and uncertainty volume resulting from positional
deviations. Extended Kalman Filter (EKF), Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) or particle filter
is used for multi-sensor data fusion of different navigation sensors to obtain the Position,
Velocity and Attitude (PVA) estimates. Pseudo-spectral optimisation (PSO) or constrained
Differential Geometric Optimization (DGO) techniques are used to generate the new
trajectory based on the available time to conflict (host manned aircraft/RPAS entering the
jamming avoidance volume). The shape of the combined jamming avoidance volume and
navigation errors is described using spherical harmonics. Depending on if the errors are
statistically independent or dependent; the resultant volume is obtained for uncorrelated or
correlated errors respectively [16-19]. The selection of the optimal trajectory from the
generated set of safe trajectories is based on minimisation of the following cost function:
ܬ= ݓ௧ ∙ tௌ஺ிா + ݓ௙ ∫[ ܵܨܥ ∙ ܶ(ݐ)]݀ݐ−wௗ ∙ ܦ௠ ௜௡−ݓ௜ௗ ∙ ∫ܦ(ݐ)݀ݐ (15)
where ܦ(ݐ) is the estimated distance of the generated avoidance trajectory points from the
avoidance volume associated with the obstacle, ܦ௠ ௜௡ = ݉ ݅݊ [ܦ(ݐ)] is the estimated minimum
distance of the avoidance trajectory from the avoidance volume, ݐௌ஺ிா = ݐ|஽೘ ೔೙ is the time at
which the safe avoidance condition is successfully attained, ܵܨܥ[௞௚
ே
∙ ݏ] is the specific fuel
consumption, ܶ(ݐ) is the thrust profile, and ݓ௧ ,ݓ௙,ݓௗ,ݓ௜ௗ are the weightings attributed to
time, fuel, distance and integral distance respectively. In time-critical avoidance applications
(i.e., closing-up on jamming environments at high relative velocities especially for military
aircraft) appropriate higher weightings are used for the time and distance cost elements.
Based on the criteria identified for integrity monitoring and augmentation, the jamming
environment represented by the radiation pattern is avoided by initiating avoidance
manoeuvres obtained from the FPOM. In order to constrain the trajectory optimization
process, dynamic constraint criteria are adopted.
Simulation Cases
Simulation case studies to evaluate the performance of the proposed GNSS ABIA integrity
augmentation strategy were performed in a number of test platforms (3-DoF and 6-DoF
aircraft dynamics models) including AIRBUS 320 (A320), TORNADO-IDS and
AEROSONDE RPAS. In all scenarios including multipath environments [15], an overall
avoidance volume is generated based on the SAA Unified Method (SUM) proposed in [19].
An avoidance trajectory is generated based on the available time to conflict using PSO or
DGO techniques. Time and fuel are used in the cost functional, the aircraft dynamics model
produces the dynamics constraints, and the satellite elevation criteria are used to set path
constraints for both PSO and DGO techniques [5]. Based on the obtained position uncertainty
about the host manned aircraft or RPAS trajectory, an optimised avoidance trajectory without
any GNSS data losses is constructed around the overall avoidance volume obtained by
combining the jamming signal radiation pattern and navigation error of the host platform. The
optimised avoidance trajectory is constructed tangential to the radiation pattern of the jammer
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(main lobe in the case of directional jammer). The optimised avoidance trajectory obtained in
the presence of directional and non-directional jammers is illustrated in Fig. 5 and 6
respectively.
Directional
Jammer
Main Lobe
Aircraft Trajectory
Position
Uncertainty
Side Lobes
Fig.5: Optimised avoidance trajectory in the presence of directional jammer
Non-directional
Jammer
Aircraft Trajectory
Position
Uncertainty
Fig.6: Optimised avoidance trajectory in the presence of non-directional jammer
A simulation run performed in MATLABTM and Simulink for the directional jammer case is
also illustrated in Fig. 7. The AEROSONDE RPAS 6-DoF dynamics model was used for this
simulation run. After the conflict detection and resolution was determined with respect to the
jamming radiation pattern, the avoidance trajectory was generated and optimized based on the
cost function defined earlier. Additionally, the constraints imposed by ABIA in terms of
RPAS platform dynamics and GNSS constellation satellite elevation angles were considered
to generate the optimised avoidance trajectory and thus preventing degradation or losses of
navigation data during the whole jammer avoidance loop.
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Fig.7: Trajectory in the presence of directional jammer
Conclusion
In this research the effects of jamming on GNSS integrity augmentation performance were
examined. The analytical models of Jamming-to-Signal (J/S) tracking thresholds for different
types of jamming were described. In particular, the models for calculating the minimum
acceptable aircraft-to-jammer ranges and the determination of the overall avoidance volume
were presented. Simulation case studies conducted in the presence of directional and non-
directional jammers demonstrated the capability of the on-board ABIA system to avoid
jamming. Further research is focussing on the ABIA evolutions for Next Generation Flight
Management System (NG-FMS) applications [20-23] as well as trajectory optimization for
future CNS+A systems and 4 Dimensional Trajectory (4DT) Intent Based Operations (IBO).
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